2022 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

8-8-2022

Diane M. Walsh v. Director Office of Workers Com

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2022

Recommended Citation
"Diane M. Walsh v. Director Office of Workers Com" (2022). 2022 Decisions. 596.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2022/596

This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2022 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 21-1354
_____________
WILLIAM E. WALSH
Petitioner
v.
DIRECTOR OFFICE OF WORKERS COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; READING ANTHRACITE COMPANY; OLD
REPUBLIC GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION
_____________________________________
On Appeal from the Benefits Review Board
(BRB No. 20-0033 BLA)
_____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
June 7, 2022
(Filed: August 8, 2022)
Before: AMBRO, RENDELL, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
_________
O P I N I O N*
_________
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
William E. Walsh petitions for review of a decision of the United States
Department of Labor Benefits Review Board (“BRB”) affirming an Administrative Law

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
*

Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of his claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act
(“BLBA”). Although Petitioner urges that the ALJ erred because her findings of fact
were not supported by substantial evidence and because she failed to explain her decision
adequately under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), we disagree and, thus, we
will deny the petition for review.
I.
Petitioner was employed by Reading Anthracite Company as a coal miner.
Petitioner developed pneumoconiosis or “black lung disease.” Petitioner experienced
symptoms such as chronic shortness of breath, which his primary care physician, Dr.
Greco, opined was the result of his pneumoconiosis. Dr. Greco concluded that Petitioner
would not be able to perform his usual duties as a coal miner and was totally disabled.
On April 8, 1991, Petitioner filed his first claim for benefits under the BLBA. On
June 25, 1991, the district director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs
(“OWCP”) denied his claim. Petitioner then requested a formal hearing before an ALJ,
who ultimately issued an order denying him benefits on November 30, 1992. The ALJ
concluded that Petitioner failed to establish the presence of pneumoconiosis or that he
was totally disabled. Petitioner appealed and sought remand so that he could modify his
claim. The BRB granted his appeal and remanded his case.
Petitioner modified his claim on various occasions over the years. On December
7, 2016, the district director of the OWCP finally granted his claim for benefits.
However, the employer appealed and requested a formal hearing before an ALJ to
determine whether Petitioner had, indeed, established that he was totally disabled and, if
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so, whether his total disability was caused by or substantially caused by his coal workers’
pneumoconiosis.
To support his claim, Petitioner submitted, among other things, a pulmonary
function study report and treatment notes from Dr. Greco, and an expert opinion by Dr.
Prince. The employer provided, among other things, its own pulmonary function study
report from Dr. Levinson, a blood gas study, and other medical records of Petitioner’s
treatment.
After reviewing the record, the ALJ denied Petitioner’s claim. The ALJ concluded
that although Petitioner established that he was totally disabled, he failed to establish that
his total disability was caused by his pneumoconiosis, or that his pneumoconiosis was a
substantially contributing cause of his total disability. The ALJ accepted Dr. Greco’s
conclusion that Petitioner suffered from various pulmonary ailments like chronic
shortness of breath, but otherwise rejected his conclusion that his pulmonary ailments
were the result of his coal workers’ pneumoconiosis rather than some other condition.
The ALJ further rejected the opinions of Dr. Levinson and Dr. Prince because he believed
their opinions were not credible and merited “little probative weight.” Id. at 36-37.
Petitioner then appealed to the BRB.
On appeal, the BRB affirmed the ALJ’s denial of Petitioner’s claim. It agreed that
that Petitioner failed to establish that his pneumoconiosis caused or substantially
contributed to his total disability. Petitioner timely filed this petition for review.

3

II.1
“Benefits are provided under the [BLBA] for or on behalf of miners who are
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(a). “A miner shall be
considered totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis if pneumoconiosis . . . is a
substantially contributing cause of the miner’s totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary
impairment.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c)(1).
There is no dispute that Petitioner was totally disabled from a respiratory or
pulmonary impairment.2 Instead, the parties dispute whether the ALJ erred in concluding
that Petitioner failed to carry his burden of showing that his coal miner pneumoconiosis
or “black lung disease” was “a substantially contributing cause” of his totally disabling
respiratory or pulmonary impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c)(1). Petitioner argues that
the ALJ erred in concluding that Petitioner did not establish causation because her
conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence and was further not accompanied

1

The Department of Labor had jurisdiction under the BLBA. 30 U.S.C. § 901. The BRB
had jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. § 921(b). We have jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C.
§ 921(c).
We review findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial
evidence. Hillibush v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 853 F.2d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1988). “Substantial
evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Soubik v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs,
366 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2004). When supported by substantial evidence, we defer to an
ALJ’s findings of fact, which are conclusive. Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72
F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 1995). “We exercise plenary review over . . . legal conclusions.”
Soubik, 366 F.3d at 233.
2

During the pendency of this appeal, Petitioner passed away. His death certificate listed
“dementia” as the immediate cause of death. Mot. for Leave to Am. Caption 3, CM/ECF
No. 53.
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by a sufficient articulation of her reasoning in violation of the APA. We reject both
arguments.
A.
First, Petitioner urges that the ALJ’s determination was not based upon substantial
evidence and that the BRB erred in its decision to affirm the denial of benefits. We
disagree.
Substantial evidence is evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Soubik, 366 F.3d at 233. Here, the ALJ reasonably rejected
Petitioner’s primary evidence of causation—Dr. Greco’s opinion—because his
conclusion that Petitioner’s pulmonary issues were caused by his pneumoconiosis was
inconsistent and unexplained. Without the benefit of Dr. Greco’s opinion, Petitioner
could not establish causation. Thus, the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence, and we discern no error in her decision.
An “ALJ has broad discretion to determine the weight accorded each doctor’s
opinion.” Balsavage v. Dir. Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 295 F.3d 390, 396 (3d
Cir. 2002). And “[t]he ALJ is not bound to accept the opinion or theory of any medical
expert, but may weigh the medical evidence and draw its own inferences.” Kertesz v.
Crescent Hills Coal Co., 788 F.2d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 1986). Petitioner argues that the
ALJ’s decision was against the weight of an abundance of documentary evidence and,
therefore, her decision is not supported by substantial evidence. The amount of evidence,
however, is not determinative. See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564 (1988)
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(explaining that the term “substantial evidence” does not require “a large or considerable
amount of evidence”).
Here, the ALJ, in her discretion, weighed the evidence and permissibly concluded
that Dr. Greco’s opinion was credible only as to his determination that Petitioner was
totally disabled. The ALJ otherwise rejected Dr. Greco’s opinion regarding causation as
not credible because it was inconsistent and unexplained. The ALJ observed that Dr.
Greco initially opined that Petitioner’s pulmonary symptoms were caused by his
cardiovascular problems. The ALJ contrasted this initial opinion with Dr. Greco’s later,
and contradictory opinion, that Petitioner’s pulmonary symptoms were caused not by his
cardiovascular problems, but instead, by his coal worker’s pneumoconiosis. The ALJ
rejected this later opinion because Dr. Greco had not supported his changed opinion with
sufficient explanation.
As Dr. Greco’s opinion was inconsistent and unexplained, the ALJ was well
within her discretion in rejecting his conclusion as to causation. Further, while the ALJ
accepted Dr. Levinson and Dr. Prince’s opinions as to Petitioner’s total disability, the
ALJ permissibly concluded that because both opinions were relatively unreasoned and
unsupported by documentary evidence, they were entitled to little weight on the question
of causation.
B.
Petitioner next claims that the BRB erred in affirming the ALJ’s decision because
the ALJ violated his due process rights under the APA by providing an insufficient
explanation of her decision to deny benefits. We disagree.
6

Under the APA, “[t]he record shall show the ruling on each finding, conclusion, or
exception presented. All decisions . . . are a part of the record and shall include a
statement of findings and conclusions . . . on all the material issues of fact, law, or
discretion presented on the record[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A).
As we note above, in reaching her decision on Petitioner’s claim, the ALJ
explained each of her decisions regarding the evidence. She determined the relative
credibility of experts and engaged in a meaningful weighing of the evidence. Indeed, she
thoroughly reviewed the evidence and credited Dr. Greco, Dr. Prince, and Dr. Levinson’s
opinions as they related to Petitioner’s total disability. Based on these opinions, the ALJ
found Petitioner was totally disabled. But as she explained, the ALJ rejected these same
opinions as they related to causation. We discern no error in her careful consideration of
this evidence.
The ALJ demonstrated a similarly careful consideration of the voluminous
documentary evidence submitted. She systematically reviewed the various medical
reports and medical entries and found that this evidence failed to support a finding that
Petitioner’s pulmonary impairment was caused by his coal workers’ pneumoconiosis or
that his pneumoconiosis was a substantially contributing cause of his pulmonary
impairment. Thus, we reject Petitioner’s argument that the ALJ failed to explain her
decision as required under the APA.
III.
For these reasons, we will deny the petition.
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